ABSTRACT In this paper, optimal control decision problems are discussed for a class of dynamic advertising models with lagged effect. Here, the dynamic model with input delay is introduced to depict the impact of the lagged effect on the development of goodwill. The purpose of the addressed problem is to utilize optimal control theory such that the performance of the channel system is maximized while achieving optimal strategy level. Specifically, by utilizing the maximum principle, optimal control decisions of channel members are obtained in the integrated and decentralized systems. Our results demonstrate whether two members benefit from the integrated system is closely related to the delay time of the advertising effect. Also, the contribution of these results is to offer a reference for making optimal control decision and the choice of decision mechanism in the channel system. Finally, an illustrative example is performed to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optimal control, as an important branch of control theory, has been extensively applied to such different fields as engineering, medicine, finance, management and economics, see. e.g. [1] - [4] . The main feature of optimal control problem is to seek an optimal control law such that state trajectories are driven into objective set and the utility functional is minimized with the control signal constrained (including equality, inequality and differential equations). Accordingly, a great deal of effort has been made concerning the optimal control problem with applications of economics and management science and a rich number of results have focused on the design method of optimal control law. More specifically, by solving a dynamic optimization problem with Pontryagin's maximum principle, the optimal joint pricing and
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Guangdeng Zong. production decisions have been proposed in [5] for perishable items without shortage. In [6] , to maximize the total profit per unit time, the optimal joint dynamic pricing, quality investment and replenishment policy have been obtained by solving on the basis of Pontryagin's maximum principle. Moreover, optimal control decisions of advertising models have also engaged much attention. For example, in [7] , boundary value problems have been explored in stochastic optimal control of advertising. Optimal advertising decision with an adverse exogenous effect has been investigated in [8] through the study of an auxiliary smooth optimal control problem. In [9] , by applying the two-part tariffs, coordination analysis problems have been discussed for static and dynamic supply chains with advertising.
As a marketing communication form, advertising is utilized to persuade the public to take some actions with respect to commercial activity or government statement. The past few decades have seen a surge of research interest on advertising decision problems due to their extensive application in the management science field. According to the model characteristics, they can generally be classified into two types: static models [10] - [13] and dynamic models [14] - [17] . Among them, static models cannot capture the impact of current period decision on future performance. Hence, dynamic models have been introduced where the change rate of goodwill (market share) has been modelled by variables, such as advertising level and goodwill (market share) level. Most results on dynamic models are usually obtained by applying the Pontryagin's maximum principle of optimal control.
On the other hand, lagged effect is the time gap from the time when investing advertising begins, to the time when the advertising takes effect to the goodwill or market share and the existing studies are scattered. Frequently occurring in the process of advertising, it comes from different sources, such as transportation or communication lags, feedback delays and so on. In the past years, continuous attention has been devoted in [18] to verify its existence and analyzed its main resources. It is notable that a discrete delay advertising model has been proposed in [19] for a monopolistic firm and optimal advertising decision has been determined. Utilizing Itô equations as continuous random variables, the sales prediction models with various effects have been presented in [20] , such as immediate effect, lagged effect, cumulative effect and diffusion effect. In [21] , based on the stochastic optimal control theory, optimal decision problem has been obtained for a monopolistic firm with lagged effect. Note that the existent literature [21] is primarily concerned with the advertising decision problem for one firm and limited work has been done for the channel system, nor to mention the discussion how delay time of advertising influences optimal control decision and choice of decision mechanism. Further studies should combine optimal control theory to construct dynamic advertising models with lagged effect in the channel system. Motivated by the above discussion, we aim to investigate the optimal control decision problems for a class of dynamic advertising models with lagged effect. Here, a dynamic model with input delay is introduced to depict the impact of lagged effect on the development of goodwill. Supposing that channel sales decrease linearly with the retail price and increase with the goodwill in a multiplicative way, optimal pricing and advertising decisions of each member are obtained in the decentralized and integrated systems. The main contributions of this paper lie in the following two aspects: (1) the advertising and pricing decisions are, for the first time, explored for the channel system with advertising lagged effect, and (2) the optimal control for linear systems with time delays in control input is adopted when solving the advertising decision problem. In addition, the main challenges can be listed as follows: (1) Taking the lagged effect into the dynamic advertising models, how do the channel members determine the optimal advertising decisions? (2) How does the lagged effect influence the pricing and advertising decisions? (3) Under what conditions are both members better off in the integrated system? An outline of this paper is as follows. Section II develops a differential game model involving a single manufacturer and a single retailer within a channel system. Section III and Section IV discuss the decentralized and integrated systems, respectively. The main results of these two decision systems are studied and compared, followed by an illustrative example in Section V. The illustrative example is given to show the change of the extra profit accrued from the integrated system relative to the decentralized system with delay time. Finally, conclusions summarize the results.
Notations: The following notations are used in this paper.
is the Hamilton functions for each member or channel system; '' * '' is used as optimal results in the decentralized system and '' * * '' is used as optimal results in the centralized system; G i (t), (i = M , R) is the goodwill level of each member at time t; U i (t), (i = M , R) is the advertising effort of each member at time t; δ > 0 is the decay rate or forgetting effect of goodwill; λ > 0 is discount rate.
II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
We consider a channel system with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, in which the manufacturer sells the products to consumers through the retailer. The manufacturer controls the wholesale price ω(t), while retailer sets the retail price p(t) at time t. They also determine their own advertising efforts U M (t) and U R (t), designed to build up the reputation or goodwill G M (t) and G R (t), respectively. The advertising lagged effect is taken into the evolution of their goodwill. Then, modifying the model from [22] , the goodwill evolution of each channel member is governed by the following delay differential equations:
The differential equations imply that the manufacturer and the retailer incur advertising investment independent of one another. In view of the work in [22] , it seems reasonable to assume that channel members independently invest advertising expenditures in promoting their goodwill. Also, the differential equations state that the goodwill evolution depends on not only goodwill level G i (t) at time t, but also advertising effort U i (t) that prevailed d i periods ago. The parameter d i > 0 represents the delay time of advertising. The parameter a i > 0 measures the advertising effectiveness and a higher a i implies that end consumers are more sensitive to the advertising. δ > 0 is the decay rate or forgetting effect of goodwill which captures the idea that consumers may forget the product to some extent. Remark 1: According to the classical Nerlove-Arrow model [23] , the impact of advertising effort on goodwill level of product or firm is immediate. However, lagged effect induces a common universal phenomenon which there is the division between advertising objective and advertising effect. Hence, there are reasons to believe that the goodwill evolution depends on not only goodwill level G i (t) at time t, but also VOLUME 7, 2019 advertising effort U i (t) at time t −d i . By modifying the model from [22] , the goodwill evolution of each channel member is governed by the delay differential equations (1) and (2), respectively.
Generally, channel sales S(t) are allowed to depend on the retail price p(t) and the goodwill level of each member G M (t) and G R (t) in a separable multiplicative way [24] - [26] , i.e.,
Here, h(p(t)) and f (G M (t), G R (t)) respectively reflect the impacts of retail price and goodwill level on the channel sales, also called sale response function. The function h(p(t)) is assumed to be linearly decreasing in retail price p(t), see, e.g.
[27]- [29] . Specifically, we have
To ensure the positive sales, we restrict p(t) < 1 β . Without loss of generality, the wholesale price is assumed to be smaller than the retail price, then 0 < ω(t) < p(t) < 1 β holds. According to [22] , sale response function f (G M (t), G R (t)) can be regarded as a linearly increasing function of the goodwill levels G M (t) and G R (t), i.e.,
where b M and b R are nonnegative parameters measuring the impact of goodwill levels on channel sales. Taking (3)- (5) together, we have
The advertising cost functions are convex and increasing with their own advertising efforts, i.e.,
. (7) In (7), k M and k R are positive constants and represent cost coefficients of advertising. These widely used convex functions mean increasing marginal costs of advertising efforts [30] - [32] . In particular, we suppose that the unit production cost is constant. Without loss of generality, we take the production cost of product equal to zero so as to simplify the expressions. Further, assuming an infinite horizon and a common discount rate λ > 0, the profit functions of channel members are respectively expressed as:
For the total channel, the corresponding profit function is
This paper mainly attempts to explore the optimal control decision problems of dynamic advertising models with lagged effect. As such, delay time d is regulated as the initial time 0, where
The equilibrium decisions for the differential game under study can be divided as two types: closed-loop and open-loop strategies. Specifically, closed-loop strategy is a function of time and state variables while open-loop strategy is only related to time. Even though a close-loop strategy has attracted more attention in the economic, marketing and operation areas, it usually increases the complexity of counting and then we assume that both members use open-loop strategy. Additionally, taking deterministic situation of our work into account, it is reasonable to believe open-loop strategy to be right for the problem of this article [33] .
III. DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM
In this section, the manufacturer, acting as the leader, firstly announces its wholesale price to maximize his own profit. Then, taking into account a constant wholesale price paid by the manufacturer to the retailer, both members set their individual strategies in order to maximize their own profits. The solutions of manufacturer and retailer are well known as the two-stage game, and we can use backward induction to firstly analyze the second stage. Therefore, combining (1)- (7), the optimization problems can be respectively solved for retailer and manufacturer: max (1), (2) and max
Now, applying the necessary condition of Maximum principle subject to the time-delay system [34] , we introduce the adjoint variables q ij (i = M , R, j = 1, 2) to construct Hamilton functions of the retailer and the manufacturer as
Based on the above Hamilton functions, the following results summarize the equilibrium decisions of the channel members in the decentralized system. Proposition 1: In the decentralized system, the optimal retail price and advertising efforts satisfy
Proof: We aim to maximize the objective function of retailer with respect to the retail price p(t) and advertising effort U R (t). Considering the retailer's objective function in equation (8) and utilizing the necessary conditions for Maximum principle, one has
Equations (13) and (14) imply
By substituting the retail price p(t) into (15), we have the solution
According to the results in [34] ,
Once c = 0, the advertising effort of retailer given in (16) will tend to be infinite when t → ∞, which does not fit the current situation. Therefore, we obtain that c = 0 holds, and combining the result in (16), the optimal advertising effort of retailer is written as:
Similarly, by using the Maximum principle, the advertising effort of manufacturer is
which ends the proof. Substituting U * M (t) and U * R (t) into (1) and (2) respectively and utilizing the initial conditions of (1) and (2), the general solutions of differential equations for goodwill G M (t) and G R (t) are given in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2:
In the decentralized system, the optimal goodwill level of each member can be rewritten as:
The steady state of goodwill level is:
4βk R (λ+δ) e δd R . According to Propositions 1 and 2, it seems to easily get the profit function of manufacturer and further analyze the existence of optimal wholesale price in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3:
δ , for any given parameters, there exists a unique optimal wholesale price ω * in the interval (0, 
Inserting optimal pricing, advertising efforts and goodwill levels into the profit function of manufacturer, we have
Calculating the first and second order derivatives of J * M (ω) with respect to ω, we have δ , we know B < 0 such that the sign oḟ J M (ω) andJ M (ω) are related to the system parameters. Note thatJ
By means of the Intermediate-value theorem, there exists ω * ∈ (0, 1 2β ) such thatJ M (ω * ) = 0 holds. Moreover, in the interval (0,
If A > , which ends the proof. Proposition 3 states the existence of optimal wholesale price, but it is difficult to provide a detailed expression of wholesale price with respect to the system parameters. This observation is in good agreement with the results published by [26] . The difference between our results and the results published in [26] is the impact of delay time on optimal wholesale price. When 0 < d M < ln 2 δ , it is easy to show that there exists a unique optimal solution ω * in the interval ( ). Otherwise, there exists more than one optimal solution. Followed by the Proposition 3, all the optimal decisions are kept the same over time.
Corollary 1: In the decentralized system, the following results are obtained at equilibrium:
(a) Both the optimal retail price and the advertising effort of manufacturer are increasing for any ω * ∈ (0, 1 2β ). Namely,
The optimal advertising effort of retailer is decreasing in wholesale price. Namely,
Later, we can obtain the optimal profits of both members
Note that the profit of each member consists of three parts which results from the initial goodwill values of both members, revenue from manufacturer's advertising and revenue from retailer's advertising. Here, the revenue from advertising is influenced by the delay time of advertising. Taking the manufacturer's profit as an example, we explain this result as follows: (a) The initial goodwill values of both members are high enough, which implies that both members create the good goodwill or reputation. So, it leads to incremental channel sales and more profit. Remark 2: To recapitulate, we model an infinite-horizon differential game with four decision variables ω(t), p(t), U M (t), U R (t) and two state variables G M (t), G R (t). In the decentralized system, both manufacturer and retailer make optimal control decisions to seek their individual profit maximization. First, we obtain the retail price p(t) and advertising effort U R (t) by maximizing the Hamilton function of retailer (8) . Second, advertising effort U M (t) can be acquired by solving the Hamilton function of manufacturer (9) . In which, p(t), U R (t) and U M (t) are all computed to be the functions of wholesale price ω. Later, by inserting p(t), U R (t) and U M (t) into profit function of manufacturer and calculating the first and second order derivatives of J M (ω) with respect to ω, we have the optimal wholesale price ω * and then obtain the optimal control decisions p * (t), U * R (t) and U * M (t). Next, let us consider that there is no lagged effect in the process of advertising. The goodwill at each outlet depends mainly on their own advertising efforts at time t. As special cases, if there is no time-delay in systems (1) and (2) , that is, d M = 0, d R = 0, then we can have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2: Considering the immediate effect of advertising, the optimal pricing and advertising efforts of channel members are given in the decentralized system:
Here, for any given parameters, there exists a unique optimal wholesale priceω * in the interval (0,
). Besides, the optimal profits of both members are:
IV. INTEGRATED SYSTEM
In the integrated system, the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically cooperative who maximize the profit of total channel by setting the optimal pricing and advertising decisions. The wholesale price is not involved in decision-making and the corresponding optimization problem is given by: (1), (2) It is worth mentioning that the retail price does not occur in the differential equations and only in the objective functional. Hence, the retailer sets the optimal retail price by maximizing the above objective functional. In other words, the retail price is obtained by maximizing p(t) (1−βp(t) ), that is p * * (t) = 1 2β . To derive the optimal advertising efforts in the integrated system, we firstly insert p * * (t) into the above objective functional and introduce the adjoint variables q C1 and q C2 to construct Hamilton function as
The following results characterize the optimal pricing and advertising decisions of channel members in the integrated system. The proofs for these results are similar to the Proposition 1.
Proposition 4: In the integrated system, the optimal retail price and advertising efforts are as follows:
It follows from Proposition 4 that all the optimal decisions are constants over time. Also, the optimal retail price is lower, while the optimal advertising efforts are higher in the integrated system than the decentralized system. Proposition 5: In the integrated system, the optimal goodwill level of each member can be rewritten as:
Substituting optimal decisions and goodwill levels of channel members in the profit function of total channel, then one has
Corollary 3: Considering the immediate effect of advertising, the optimal pricing and advertising efforts of channel members are given in the integrated system:
and the optimal profit of channel is
Remark 3: It is worth mentioning that, optimal control decision problems can be easily given for channel systems with multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers based on the proposed results. To be specific, by considering the effect of competitors on goodwill and channel sales, in which competitors' advertising efforts are adverse to the evolution of goodwill and channel sales is allowed to depend positively on the competitors' retail price, dynamic decision model will be constructed for channel systems with multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers. Based on the optimal control theory, the optimal retail price and advertising efforts can be acquired in the different decision systems, including Decentralized-Decentralized (DD) system, Decentralized-Centralized (DC) system and Centralized-Centralized (CC) system, respectively.
Based on the aforementioned models, we compare the optimal retail price and advertising decisions in the integrated system with those in the decentralized setting. The following Proposition recapitulates the relative findings.
Proposition 6: Comparing the decentralized with the integrated systems, we obtain:
(a) The retail price decreases in the integrated system, that is, p * (t) > p * * (t).
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(b) The channel members invest more advertising efforts in the integrated system, that is,
The goodwill levels of channel members increase in the integrated system, that is,
The channel sales increase in the integrated system, that is, S * * (t) > S * (t). Proposition 6 indicates that, whether lagged effect occurs or not, the integrated system is an effective incentive policy for stimulating advertising efforts, strengthening the goodwill and further pushing up the channel sales. Now, we compare the optimal profit of total channel in the integrated system with it in the decentralized system. Applying the different system parameters will drastically increase the complexity of counting, which becomes intractable for the comparison on the channel profit. For comparison, we especially suppose
Proposition 7: Supposing that α = βω * , for any given constants λ > 0, δ > 0 and a, b, k > 0, the profit of total channel is higher in the integrated system, if and only if the delay time pair (d M , d R ) satisfies the following condition:
Proof: Noting from (20), (21) and (25), one has
Letting βω * = α, the equation (26) can be rewritten as where x 0 , y 0 , ε 1 , ε 2 and ε 3 are defined in the Proposition 7.
Moreover, let us verify that ε 3 > 0. According to the definition of α > 0, it is straightforward to see that ε 2 is positive. On the other hand, taking the derivative of the function 1 − 4α 2 (1 − α) 2 with respect to α, we have that the minimum value of this function is 3 4 when α = 0.5 and the maximum value is 1 when α = 0, 1. Namely,
≤ 1 and ε 1 > 0. Hence, we get that ε 3 > 0 holds.
Subsequently, J * * C ≥ J * M + J * R holds if and only if
It is easy to verify that the point (1, 1) belongs to the above ellipse domain and then the feasible domain is nonempty set. Summarizing the above discussions, it can be shown that (e δd M , e δd R ) ∈ is a necessary and sufficient condition which can ensure the total channel better off in the integrated situation. This completes the proof of Proposition 7.
From the Proposition 7, the delay time is a key factor for both members in choosing decision-making mechanism. We find that J can take positive or negative values depending on the region of point (e δd M , e δd R ) illustrated in Figure 1 . To be specific, the feasible domain of point (e δd M , e δd R ) is the set {(x, y)|x ≥ 1, y ≥ 1} which splits into two subregions: the Region I and Region II. When the point (e δd M , e δd R ) in the subset of ellipse domain (Region I), both members are better off in the integrated system. Otherwise, to ensure their own profit maximization, the manufacturer and retailer will tend to adopt the decentralized system. Moreover, with the initial goodwill value increasing, the scope of feasible region becomes larger. In this situation, when the initial goodwill is higher enough, although the longer delay time of advertising effect lasts, the manufacturer and the retailer are still willing to accept the integrated system.
Remark 4: A point that should be stressed is that, without considering lagged effect, some results in [15] , [22] , [35] emphasize that the profit of total channel is always higher in the integrated system. It is a special case of Proposition 7 in our paper. Therefore, our work not only enriches and develops advertising decision problems but also deepens the research on classical Nerlove-Arrow model [23] .
Remark 5: Note that product-harm crisis, as an unavoidable phenomenon, often occurs in the operating process of channel system and product-harm crisis phenomenon will bring significant changes for the goodwill evolution of channel members in pre-and post-crisis regimes. Hence, it is necessary to discuss optimal pricing and advertising decision problems for channel system with lagged effect and product-harm crisis. The mathematical models of these phenomena can be well described by switching systems. More detailed phenomenon portray and planning decisions can be considered in [36] - [39] . Moreover, the stochastic noise is of great importance in the real world. The stochastic noise has two ways, namely, internal noise and external noise. In general, the internal random fluctuations in the processing of goodwill evolution are inevitable as industrial background or humanitarian factor and the external noise originates in one or more uncontrollable variables of enterprises. Therefore, it is importance of to handle the stochastic noise to improve the performance of brand goodwill. According to the results in [40] - [42] , we will study the stochastic optimal control problems for channel system with lagged effect at the stochastic market environment.
V. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, an illustrative example is given here to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed results and the impact of delay time on the extra profit accrued from the integrated system relative to the decentralized system.
Example 1: Considering a channel system with a brand clothing Co., LTD A and large department store B, in order to show effectiveness of the proposed scheme, we collect the marketing data of large department store B and sale data of brand A during the continuous 52-day in 2015. By using the parameter identification method, the following parameter values are obtained to establish ranges for model parameters: Table 1 .
From the simulation, it can be concluded that the optimal retail price is less and advertising efforts of channel members are higher in the integrated system than the decentralized system. Moreover, for a constant delay time, both the optimal retail price and the advertising effort of manufacturer increase with optimal wholesale price, but the optimal advertising effort of retailer deceases with optimal wholesale price. The result indicates that, when the manufacturer makes a higher wholesale price, the retailer will raise retail price due to strategic complements. In addition, the advertising effort of retailer and the wholesale price are strategic substitutes, meaning that the retailer can be stimulated to invest more in advertising activity though the lower wholesale price paid by the manufacturer.
Next, we investigate the impact of delay time on the extra profit accrued from the integrated system relative to the decentralized system. To gain qualitative analysis regarding how extra profit varies as delay time d M and d R ranging from 1 to 10 in steps of 2.5257, we choose a optimal wholesale price ω * = 2 ∈ (0, 1 2β ) and take other parameters fixed. Figure 2 (a) plots the change of the extra profit J with the delay time and Figure 2 (b) is the contour plot of the extra profit J . Figure 2 suggests that the longer delay time persists, the less channel members get benefits from the integrated system which is further verified the effectiveness of Proposition 7. Specifically, when the delay time satisfies (e δd M −0.7718) 2 1.0439
+ (e δd R −0.6531) 2 1.5871 ≤ 1, the total channel profit is higher in the integrated system. In this situation, all channel members would prefer the integrated system. Otherwise, each member makes favorable decision for themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has concerned with optimal control decision problems for a class of dynamic advertising models subject to the lagged effect. Here, delay differential equations have been developed to depict the impact of lagged effect on the improvement of goodwill. By utilizing the Maximum principle of optimal control theory, optimal pricing and advertising decisions have been presented in the decentralized and integrated systems. Finally, an illustrative example is given to show the effectiveness of the proposed results. Our paper VOLUME 7, 2019 makes the following contributions to the channel strategy literature:
(i) We use the optimal control theory with delay in control to explore the dynamic advertising decision problems in the supply chain management system.
(ii) Lagged effect has been introduced into optimal control decision problems for dynamic advertising models in a channel system. Research on dynamic advertising decision problem with lagged effect not only enriches and develops the theoretical results of advertising effects, but also deepens the problems of advertising decision.
As to the future research directions, the product-harm crisis phenomenon can be considered and incorporated into the optimization. In addition, the competition between products in the same group and stochastic noise of goodwill can also be investigated for the channel system. The corresponding results will be presented in the near future. 
